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Construction of several new Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) 
laboratories and expansion of existing operations have cre-
ated an increased international demand for well-trained staff 
and facility leaders. Directors of most North American BSL-4 
laboratories met and agreed upon a framework for leader-
ship and training of biocontainment research and operations 
staff. They agreed on essential preparation and training that 
includes theoretical consideration of biocontainment prin-
ciples, practical hands-on training, and mentored on-the-job 
experiences relevant to positional responsibilities as essen-
tial preparation before a person’s independent access to a 
BSL-4 facility. They also agreed that the BSL-4 laboratory 
director is the key person most responsible for ensuring that 
staff members are appropriately prepared for BSL-4 opera-
tions. Although standardized certiﬁ   cation of training does 
not formally exist, the directors agreed that facility-speciﬁ  c, 
time-limited documentation to recognize speciﬁ  c skills and 
experiences of trained persons is needed.
T
he threat of terrorists using as weapons the most deadly 
pathogens known, coupled with the recognition that 
virtually every year a new infectious disease is discovered, 
has led the US government to expand the number of Bio-
safety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories, also known as maxi-
mum containment laboratories (MCLs), to perform work 
essential for promoting public health and to ensure bioter-
rorism preparedness. A few such laboratories have been in 
existence for decades, primarily in Australia, Russia, South 
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States; these 
have had, in most instances, an exceptional history of safe-
ty in handling these most dangerous pathogens. However, 
construction of new facilities, including 2 national labora-
tories on academic campuses in the United States, and the 
expansion of existing US facilities, has resulted in public 
concern and Congressional inquiries regarding the safety 
of these laboratories and the qualiﬁ  cations of those persons 
working in them (1,2).
Historically, a small, close-knit group of dedicated 
scientists have made their careers working in this highly 
specialized BSL-4 environment. Laboratory directors have 
generally had hands-on involvement in research activities 
undertaken in their facilities, have personally trained those 
with whom they worked, and have been careful to restrict 
access to those not well suited for containment-laboratory 
endeavors. The current expansion of BSL-4 laboratories, 
within the United States and in several other countries, has 
resulted in a demand for experienced workers, which pres-
ents a unique challenge to currently established processes 
for BSL-4 training (3). Given the global demand for BSL-4 
laboratory workers to staff the expanded number of facili-
ties, there is a clear international need for more structured 
and transparent BSL-4 training processes to establish and 
verify standards for the next generation of containment-
laboratory scientists (4). Development of rigorous stan-
dards for BSL-4 laboratory training will instill conﬁ  dence 
in the public, policy makers, and security ofﬁ  cials that the 
expanded international network of BSL-4 laboratories will 
continue to be operated safely and will pose no risk to sci-
entiﬁ  c staff, local communities, surrounding environment, 
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and host nations. Clariﬁ  cation and coordination of training 
standards will help to develop a cadre of highly qualiﬁ  ed 
biocontainment workers and will result in a series of robust 
BSL-4 laboratory programs that will enable scientists to 
develop measures to deal with existing threat agents and to 
cope with new diseases that emerge (5).
In response to this challenge, the BSL-4 laboratory 
directors from most existing North American laborato-
ries and those currently under construction met to develop 
a framework of standards and norms necessary for train-
ing future MCL scientists and support staff. The results of 
those deliberations are summarized below and offered as a 
model for the global BSL-4 laboratory community.
MCL Management Structure
Although the institutional director (e.g., director of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, commander 
of the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases, or dean at an academic campus) has ultimate re-
sponsibility for the BSL-4 facility housed within his or her 
institution, it is the BSL-4 laboratory director that senior 
leadership relies upon to ensure that this unique facility 
operates safely and securely. The BSL-4 program director 
oversees all personnel working in the containment labora-
tory, ensures proper training and qualiﬁ  cations for the work 
to be undertaken, ensures that all regulatory requirements 
are addressed, and is responsible for maintaining a safe and 
efﬁ  cient work environment. The BSL-4 laboratory direc-
tor often also serves as the lead scientist for investigations 
involving highly pathogenic organisms, sets priorities and 
coordinates activities within the facility, and frequently 
serves as the technical spokesperson for the program. The 
BSL-4 laboratory director grants ﬁ  nal approval for person-
nel to operate independently in the BSL-4 laboratory. His 
or her efforts are complemented by those of the institu-
tional biosafety ofﬁ  cer or manager, who plays an important 
role as an independent advisor to the institutional director 
to ensure the safe and secure operations of the program, 
and the building engineer, who manages the complex me-
chanical infrastructure necessary to enable safe handling 
of highly dangerous pathogens. The BSL-4 laboratory di-
rector works in close partnership with these professionals 
to ensure smooth operation of the MCL. Each person has 
distinct responsibilities and, in most instances, a parallel 
reporting chain that ensures that problems are brought to 
the level of the institutional director or the academic dean 
for resolution.
Preparation of a Person for BSL-4 Work
Persons seeking access to a BSL-4 laboratory come 
from many different backgrounds, but they must all share 
common traits of having an aptitude for work with infec-
tious agents and an appreciation of the need for careful 
adherence to safety standards and protocols. Medical ex-
aminations, security checks, and clearances are required 
before a person can handle select agents; some laborato-
ries require vaccinations before a person can begin work 
with an infectious agent (licensed vaccines are not widely 
available for most BSL-4 pathogens.) There is a need 
to remain ﬂ  exible in the selection of persons for BSL-4 
training, recognizing that some persons rapidly acquire 
the skills needed to work safely in the BSL-4 laboratory, 
while others may never gain complete conﬁ  dence of the 
MCL director and will always be required to work in part-
nership with a more experienced person. Prior work at a 
BSL-3 laboratory is generally considered a strong asset 
but is not an absolute requirement before being cleared to 
work in a BSL-4 laboratory. What is essential is that the 
person must be properly trained in the techniques he or 
she will be using in the BSL-4 laboratory.
In addition to core scientiﬁ  c staff, there is an ongo-
ing need for BSL-4 laboratory support personnel to service 
equipment, maintain the building, conduct inspections, and 
assist in speciﬁ  c technical activities such as the care and 
use of laboratory animals. These persons also require spe-
cialized training and approval to operate independently.
Elements of Training
Formal training in preparation for work in a BSL-4 lab-
oratory should consist of 3 elements: didactic or classroom-
style theoretical preparation, one-on-one practical training 
in the facility, and mentored on-the-job training (Figure). 
Theoretical training helps laboratory workers develop an 
understanding of the underpinnings of biocontainment op-
erations and the laboratory systems that support these oper-
ations. Hands-on practical training includes a comprehen-
sive orientation to the speciﬁ  c facility in which the person 
will work to include a complete review and documented 
understanding of all standard operating procedures; orien-
tation to engineering aspects of the facility; overview of all 
safety procedures, including alarms and emergency opera-
tions; and an introduction to the care and use of a protective 
suit or glove box. The institutional biosafety ofﬁ  cer and 
building engineer typically assist in providing this orienta-
tion, some of which may be augmented by training videos.
BSL-4 laboratory orientation training assumes that 
the person has already mastered all procedures for safe 
and secure handling of infectious agents at the BSL-2 and 
ideally BSL-3 levels. This training generally involves in-
dividualized orientation within the facility provided by an 
experienced staff member or dedicated training ofﬁ  cer. It 
may begin while the laboratory is shut down for annual 
recertiﬁ  cation and maintenance or while it is operational. 
Training would involve use of entrances simply designed 
to demonstrate how one enters and exits the suite, general 
orientation on the use of air hoses, working within biologic 
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safety cabinets or glove boxes, storage and record keeping 
of pathogens, clean-up and decontamination following pro-
cedures or spills, solid and liquid waste management, use 
of autoclaves and other specialized equipment, communi-
cations with others inside and outside of the BSL-4 facility, 
and other general procedures.
Finally, the person under consideration is assigned a 
dedicated mentor and is introduced to working with live 
pathogens in the BSL-4 laboratory under the mentor’s 
close supervision. This stage of training is basically open 
ended; the length of time and number of entries into the 
facility will vary greatly depending upon the skills of the 
person and his or her ability to master all procedures neces-
sary for independent work. Final decision of when a person 
is allowed independent access is subjective and based on an 
assessment by the mentor and laboratory director; it is usu-
ally discussed only after the person has had extensive ex-
perience working in the facility. The time required to gain 
full independent access may also vary depending upon the 
kind of work that person will be undertaking. For example, 
persons not likely to be directly handling infectious mate-
rial, such as safety ofﬁ  cers, building engineers, or main-
tenance staff, may be offered limited independent access 
sooner than a person who will be handling live pathogens 
routinely. Partial or limited access may also be granted to 
a person for independent access only during normal duty 
hours. Laboratory procedures that involve animals or sharp 
instruments (e.g., needles, syringes, postmortem proce-
dures) represent the greatest risk and consequently require 
special training and experience; these procedures should 
be mastered at lower containment levels before a person is 
permitted to undertake these activities under BSL-4 condi-
tions. Most standard operating procedures for animal ma-
nipulation require that at least 2 persons be present, regard-
less of their experience level. Some laboratories require a 
ﬁ  nal oral or written examination before granting a person 
independent access, which may be administered by the 
safety ofﬁ  cer. However, the ultimate decision as to who 
is allowed independent access to the BSL-4 laboratory is 
made by the BSL-4 laboratory director.
A typical mentor will be an experienced person who 
has earned full unrestricted access to the laboratory and has 
the clear conﬁ  dence of the laboratory director. Although 
there are no set time or formal educational requirements to 
become a mentor, mentors should have extensive practical 
experience working under BSL-4 laboratory conditions.
All laboratories should have developed a process for 
reevaluation of all persons working in the BSL-4 labora-
tory to ensure that their knowledge and skills remain cur-
rent. This process may be an annual refresher course or 
periodic formal or informal review and training and may 
be augmented by orientation sessions as new equipment is 
introduced into the facility. Ensuring that senior program 
staff members are regularly present in the laboratory is 
important for maintaining consistent safety, security, and 
scientiﬁ  c standards.
Need for Certiﬁ  cation of Training
The need to document that a person has completed 
appropriate training has been discussed extensively. It is 
evident that a tacit internal certiﬁ  cation exists in BSL-4 
facilities currently operating and this takes the form of ap-
proval to work independently. This certiﬁ  cation may be 
more formally captured in a speciﬁ  c document or may be a 
checklist signed by the approval authority. A more broadly 
applicable documentation system could provide evidence 
of consistency in training, demonstrate recognized capabil-
ities with certain tasks such as for animal handlers, and pro-
vide a mechanism to gauge the number of persons working 
in the ﬁ  eld.
At present, those working in BSL-4 laboratories in 
the United States need security clearance and approval to 
handle select agents, must have completed the extensive 
training program described above, must have medical ex-
aminations, and must be known by the program director. 
Each BSL-4 laboratory is, however, unique and every pro-
gram director should demand that all persons entering their 
facility be well prepared and knowledgeable of all safety 
and security procedures required of that facility. Although 
standardized documentation of training does not formally 
exist, there would be merit in developing an internation-
ally agreed-upon facility-speciﬁ  c, time-limited document 
to recognize the speciﬁ  c skills and experiences of a per-
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son. Such documentation would have the added beneﬁ  t of 
facilitating collaborations and personnel exchanges among 
BSL-4 laboratories.
Conclusions
Directors of most North American existing and pro-
posed BSL-4 laboratories agreed upon a framework for 
training of BSL-4 laboratory staff, including scientiﬁ  c, 
technical, and support personnel such as animal handlers, 
building engineers, and maintenance workers. Indepen-
dent access to the BSL-4 facility would be granted at the 
discretion of the BSL-4 program director after successful 
completion of training in the theory of biocontainment 
principles, practical hands-on suit training, and extensive 
supervised work with infectious agents under the tutelage 
of a well-experienced mentor. Periodic reassessment of 
skills and ongoing refresher training would be a routine as-
pect of continuing education for all BSL-4 staff. The need 
for documentation of training that would be time-limited 
and speciﬁ  c for a given facility was also discussed. Such 
formal documentation could facilitate collaborations and 
personnel exchange between BSL-4 facilities and help to 
better certify the national BSL-4 workforce. The frame-
work proposed could serve as a model for BSL-4 work-
force development globally.
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